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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and proves that a
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information without
compromising the security and privacy of internet users. For the last three decades, the
process of monitoring access, usage and IP address assignments has fallen on the internet
service providers who allow access to the internet through their IP portals. Since they held the
door to the internet, there was reasonability in the idea that they should monitor who goes in
and out of that door. That concept remained stagnant because an alternative methodology did
not exist and numerous regulations, fees, restrictions, and uses were developed over time to fit
that model. This thesis details how the implementation of a centralized IP address database
will provide a transition from the legacy ‘provider assigned and monitored’ model and offer a
first-of-its-kind system that migrates policing functions back under the control of the policing
authorities. The system establishes the best segregation of expertise, allowing the providers to
provide service, the policing authorities to provide policing, and the governmental authorities,
who define security safeguards, to also maintain it. Research methodologies incorporated in
the development of this new concept include extensive interviews with law enforcement as
well as in-depth research on internet legislative reforms, governmental systems, and security
concerns and requirements. This review led to a system that successfully meets the needs of
the user, the service provider, law enforcement, and governmental entities alike.
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Introduction
When IPv4 was first outlined in RFC 791 in 1981 it was the forth version of internet protocol
and the first to be introduced for public use. In its introduction its scope was defined as
follows: “The internet protocol is specifically limited in scope to provide the functions necessary
to deliver a package of bits (an internet datagram) from a source to a destination over an
interconnected system of networks..”1 In 1981, there was no realization as to what an
‘interconnected system of networks’ was to become over the next 30 years. A globally
interconnected communication, financial, social, economic network, where everything from
video games to telephone service and vehicle navigation was intertwined in a single network,
was unforeseen. An address structure that could provide 4,294,967,296 unique addresses
seemed able to accommodate interconnectivity for all perpetuity. Teleport into the future 30
years and we find a world where much of our existence, from our work to our home to our
government, could not function without a world-wide network that is always on and always
available. Presently most technology providers are now working on a migration to the newest
version of internet protocol, IPv6, to accommodate the exponential growth in networked
applications and interconnected users. This new version of IP, based on a format of 128 bits,
extends IP addressing to 3.4×1038 unique IP addresses. As our predecessors believed with IPv4,
technologists once again believe this new quantity should accommodate all IP addresses
needed for perpetuity. Will it? It sounds limitless until one begins to count the number of

1

Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California. Internet Protocol. Darpa Internet Program
Protocol Specification. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt (accessed January 2011).
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devices that can at some point become ‘enabled’ and suddenly the number seems only
reasonable and not limitless.
We look at our IP processes and our evolution of networking through the same 1981 eyes.
Many functions or processes are directed toward a network environment based on a single
point in time and then work to keep their place intact as the technologies around them change.
This is commonplace when looking at the historical legislation that has attempted to modify or
direct the internet and its use. With a legislative process mired in partisanship and lobbying,
legislative orders can take years to implement. Often by the time they are implemented the
technologies they are based upon have changed. Dictates are implemented based on a point in
time without proper preparation of what is to come. This holds true to the very components of
the internet itself and the most basic connecting block to that global interface which is the IP
address. The national model of IP address assignment, as well as its subsequent use, storage,
protection, and investigation, are all based on models that were developed back when IPv4 was
going to automate the business world and long before IPv6 meant we might have enough IP
address space to automate every single tool in our lives. In 1981, without the vision to see
where this new internet could go and the comprehension that this new internetworking
platform could one day become a new criminal front, the processes for protection of a user’s
internet security were undefined as were the methods to protect and police it. Without the
knowledge or tools to perform these monitoring and policing functions, the tasks fell upon the
one group that could, the service providers who were providing the IP address token that
opened up the global internet for use. Service providers moved from the role of providing
internet services to their subscribers, to a role of providing internet monitoring, logging and
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reporting to the government and law enforcement. While subscribers were willing to pay for
the use of the provider’s network, governmental agencies were not willing to pay for the usage
surveillance they required of those same subscribers, leaving the cost burdens to fall upon the
provider and ultimately back on the subscribers themselves. The process formed as a reaction
to changes that government and law enforcement were not prepared to address. A world wide
educational and business integration platform was suddenly an open access portal for
unrestricted and anonymous criminal activity. Stepping back and now assessing the reality that
is the internet, and the freedoms that US citizens have grown to expect in every aspect of their
lives, the process of providers being the entity of internet surveillance seems archaic and
dysfunctional. There must be a better way to bring the policing function to the agencies that
are appropriately trained to perform it.

This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and proves that a
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information not accessible
in today’s traditional provider-only process, without compromising the security and privacy
of internet users.

4

A Review of IP Address Management Today
Most internet users are unaware of the systems or processes that support their access to the
internet. Very simply they want the internet to be available 24x7x365 and, other than the
monthly fee to their provider, know very little about the technologies that get them there.
Here is a recap of how the internet IP process works.

Internet service providers (ISPs) purchase ranges of IP addresses from an Internet Assigned
Number Authority (IANA). This IANA provides the ISP with exclusive ownership/use for the IP
address space for as long as the ISP continues renewal. ISPs then divide these IP address ranges
into smaller allocation blocks, typically segregated by geographic regions. Within these
allocation blocks individual IP addresses are then leased to the ISP’s customers for a monthly
subscription fee. Figure 1 shows the chain of IP address allocation for providers within the
United States.

United States

Figure 1: IANA
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This subscribed IP address provides the customer with a connection method or access point to
the Internet. In order to adequately share the IP address resources across the ISP’s customer
base, customers share a dynamic pool of addresses. Upon subscribing, an IP lease is assigned
to the customer and is given a varying lifespan for the customer dependent upon customer use.
While a standard lease period may range from one day to several months, customer usage
often regulates how often a subscriber’s IP address will change or how long a customer may
retain one unique IP address. The process works as follows:

A customer purchases data services from an ISP and receives an IP address upon connecting
through the provider’s network. The service provider issues the customer a default lease of
<14 days> for the IP assignment (a typical value). If the customer does not regularly use the IP
address (not using their computer regularly or powering down their data modem for extended
periods of time) the IP address will be pulled back into the allocation pool to be assigned to
another subscriber for internet use. Should the first customer resume internet connectivity,
the ISP would assign the customer another IP address from the pool. This scenario outlines the
process of ‘dynamic’ IP address allocation, allowing a range of IP addresses to be shared across
all of the provider’s subscribers. Without this dynamic process, IP addresses would become
static, and once assigned would remain with a customer for perpetuity. Static assignments
would greatly diminish the number of IP addresses available for new subscribers, having tied up
assignments for subscribers who may no longer be using them or use them infrequently.
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This assigned IP address is the Internet access point for the subscriber. ISPs are able to link the
IP assignment to the customer in order to track allocation of bandwidth and service usage. This
IP address links the customer to their internet activity and is the technical connection to ensure
activities on the World Wide Web accurately make their way through the ISP back to the
intended computer / user. This ability to link the customer to their specific activity on the
internet is a technical requirement. It is also the basis for broad concern about the privacy of a
subscriber’s internet activity and identification relative to cyber crime.

While desiring always-on connectivity, consumers have grown more cognizant of security
liabilities inherent in the internet. Identity theft and cyber crimes have become frequent topics
for local and national news making it important to understand that today’s IP management
process was developed for a reason. Instances of internet crimes increased at staggering rates,
with criminals operating in complete anonymity in an environment nearly free of policing. After
9/11, few citizens would argue that national security is not vitally important and none would be
tolerant of a government that allowed another terrorist act upon its citizens. The argument for
accurate and timely internet identification information is valid when it relates to criminal or
terrorist activity. How can that criminal activity be separated from the millions of legitimate
internet transactions that occur every day?

For law enforcement officials, the process of locating a cyber criminal can be arduous and
unfruitful. Because ISP were not historically required to retain subscriber IP address data, many
didn’t or routinely only kept data for 30 days or less. When investigators identified criminal
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internet activity, they were unable to determine who it originated from because ISPs either
didn’t have it, or the process to request it took so long that data was long since purged by the
time it was requested. There was no legal leverage requiring the ISPs to track the data or keep
it. On the other side of the issue, ISPs also had a legitimate requirement to protect the privacy
of their subscribers. Unauthorized access to subscriber information, by linking internet usage
to the IP address assigned to the customer, could result in hefty penalties to ISPs. The middle
ground came in the creation of the two-subpoena process where law enforcement and
government agencies could legally subpoena the ISP to provide subscriber records. The process
is as follows:

Investigators identify a screen name as the originator of a criminal activity. The law
enforcement unit must subpoena the provider of the screen name (say AOL) to obtain the IP
address that the screen name is being accessed from. The legal process of providing the
subpoena to AOL and the subsequent processing time of the subpoena by AOL can take many
days or weeks. Here, the AOL email/instant message service is an application operating on top
of the internet connection provided by the ISP.

When the investigator receives the response to the subpoena from <AOL> they next have to
research the IP address provided to determine which ISP owns that IP range. The IP addressed
could be owned by Verizon, Comcast, or any one of hundreds of small ISP providers around the
country. When the determination is made as to who’s network the activity is occurring on, law
enforcement must then provide a second subpoena to the ISP requesting subscriber name and
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address information. As was the case with the first subpoena, a response can take anywhere
from several days to many weeks. The response time, from an investigators perspective, is too
long to be productive or reasonable. They can identify criminal activity but have no ability to
locate the whereabouts or identify of the criminal long after the activity has occurred.

Keep in mind that the process outlined here is the best-case scenario. Where the subpoena
process is a legal matter, any error… typographical or otherwise… can result in the document
being returned for correction. Any such error only adds to the delay in obtaining information.
Many law enforcement agencies recount having to wait a year or more for information to be
provided. These delays only increase the likelihood that data will no longer be available, no
longer in archive at the ISP. Nearly half of subpoenaed information for ISP data is returned as
‘no data on file’2.

For the ISP it is also a matter of quantity. In an email interview with one ISP’s Senior Director of
Compliance and Legal Affairs, the compliance team can receive anywhere from 350 to 450
subpoenas per month. When those subpoenas are broken down to the individual IP addresses
to be researched, the number grows to more than 630 subpoenaed IP address requests per
month. The team of five subpoena processors is responsible for documenting, researching,
processing and responding to each of these subpoena requests. While the average response is
10 days, many can take much longer depending upon the date of the original activity and
whether the data has been archived offsite. As high as this volume may seem, this quantity

2

Zonk. "US Government Demands Data Retention." (June 2, 2008), Slashdot. (accessed October 19, 2010).
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only reflects requests specific to IP address information (only data service activity) and is not
inclusive of IP phone records which are handled by a third party. Inclusion of VoIP records
would double the volume of responses this ISP is required to handle each month. Once
subpoenaed, data relative to the subpoena must be retained for a period of 3 years,
compounding data storage and privacy liabilities.

This requirement for ISPs to retain IP information about their subscribers has led to numerous
legislative and systematic changes both for the provider and the consumer. There is a
legitimate need to link consumers to their internet activity. There is also legitimate concern
that in doing so, private information about a consumer can be accessed. Could there be a
better way to allow law enforcement quick access to identify criminal activity while better
safeguarding the privacy of customer identifiable information?

IP Address Registration Database

Conceptual Definition

Let’s compare an IP address to a vehicle’s license plate. While a license plate, by itself, does not
provide the public with any details of the user / owner of the vehicle, a license plate does
provide information when it is retrieved from a secure database managed and accessed by
State and law enforcement agencies. The vehicle registration database does not contain a log
of every highway, road or bridge a driver uses, or the speed at which they drove, or the time of

10
day. Instead, the database contains a mechanism to link a license plate to an owner’s personal
information specific to the vehicle being queried. Any determination of infraction or restriction
is up to law enforcement to identify and record. The nation’s highways remain available for
open use with the exception of having to pay for service on freeways and toll roads. At the
simplest level, the only information that can be determined by the license plate itself is the
state of registration and the month and year of registration.

Now let’s apply this to an IP address. The IP address, by itself, does not contain or provide any
personal information of its owner / user. While the owning ISP can be identified, similar to the
state of registration of a vehicle tag, personal information about a specific user is not available
strictly by view of the IP address. As each user is assigned an IP address, often after paying a
toll to an ISP for use of that internet highway, that user has open and unrestricted access to all
lanes on the internet. While the ISPs provide the opening through the toll to use the roads,
they do not provide monitoring services to determine who is exercising lawful or unlawful
behavior. That policing function is performed by governmental or law enforcement agencies
using various tools within their arsenal. In the same way a patrolman identifies offending
vehicles and targets them for further identification, the same is true of users on the internet
and their assigned IP address. Until such time as their activity triggers further inquiry, the user
is unhindered from using the internet and all its capabilities.

To implement this theory of a centralized IP address database, there must be both an input of
information from the service provider and storage, indexing, and archiving data systems at the
state and/or federal levels. Here is how it works:
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Customer X purchases internet service from an ISP such as Comcast. Comcast assigns the
customer an IP address of 77.10.176.18. That transaction is sent to the IP Address Repository
(IPAR). The data string contains such information as the IP address, date and time of
assignment, Customer X, and an ID tag associated with the ISP. While a typical IP reservation
period is 14 days, with continued use and limited system maintenance the user can maintain an
IP address for extended periods of time, sometimes up to a year or more. In the event a new IP
address is issued, regardless of when or by what mechanism, that IP record is sent to the IPAR
as an update record. The update record contains Customer X, IP Address assignment, date &
time, and ISP id tag. Over the course of use, the IPAR will be updated multiple times per
internet subscriber. Customer X will show multiple entries, each with an IP address and date
and time of assignment. IP Address information can be sorted to identify all IP assignments to
named users, to physical location or other groupings.

Here are several of the concepts in play in a state and federal IPAR system:

a. Historical recording and archiving of IP address information is moved from the ISPs
to state, federal and/or law enforcement agencies.

b. Security management of IP information would be maintained by the same entities
already responsible for managing highly confidential information. Similar to the
vehicle registration database, these entities already keep confidential information
such as:

a. vehicle registrations, restrictions, and fines
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b. social security information including social security numbers, benefits and
litigation
c. taxation information including compensation, employment and garnishments
d. criminal records by jurisdiction area

These are entities already well versed in the management and retention of very
confidential information...information that is much more highly confidential than an
IP address.

c. Access to customer indentifying information becomes immediate. The common,
two-subpoena process is reduced by one, if not both subpoena processes.

d. Law enforcement would continue to be held to requirements of reasonable cause
for information requests.

e. Small providers, who could not afford the cost of data collection and retention, can
support an IPAR implementation, increasing availability to subscriber information
that was otherwise unavailable.

f. There is no change in the existing definition for the line between reasonable search
and concerns relative to accessing the IPAR for surveillance. The same statutory and
legislative proceedings exist, with the only change being the caretaker of the
information.
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g.

Yahoo, MSN, and Google fall under separate and specific definitions for Internet
‘applications’. Consumers already have access to the highway before they can
access these applications. These applications would continue to be subpoenaed for
search or usage information, in the same way a Transit Authority can be subpoenaed
for records on toll interchange usage.

Public Confidentiality and Privacy

There lies a dichotomy in concern relative to the internet. Users want the unhindered freedom
to use the global internet at their own discretion. Users also want, ideally expect, to be
safeguarded from attack, exploitation, surveillance and other invasions of privacy while
exercising their internet freedoms. With the internet being a somewhat lawless environment,
service providers bear increasing burdens to ensure the safety of subscriber identity and
activity. Limited monitoring and policing, however, has allowed the internet to grow as a safe
haven for criminal activity. How, then, does the IP Address Repository provide improvements
to securing confidential information and protecting the privacy of consumers?

The IPAR would follow similar requirements as defined in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act or
DPPA. The DPPA was implemented in 1994 to ensure the protection of personal information
contained within the records of the Department of Motor Vehicle.3 This Act outlined specifics
for restricting the use of a license plate or vehicle identification number (VIN) from being used
3

Epic.org. “The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DDPA) and the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle Record.”
Electronic Privacy Information Center. http://epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (accessed October 11, 2010).
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to search for the name of the vehicle owner. In addition, this Act defined specifics for DPPA
permissible use, outlining processes for obtaining access to records that contain personal
information. Law enforcement would be allowed protected ‘search accounts’ to have frequent,
ad hoc access to information. Other entities, unless granted specific approved access, would
have no accessibility to the private information.

The IPAR would have very similar guidelines and restrictions. Unless an entity is granted
specific ‘permissible use’ access to personally-identifiable information, the database remains
restricted from access. While legislation such as the Patriot Act4 lessened governmental
restrictions on internet surveillance, law enforcement agencies are still required to obtain a
court order before they are authorized to monitor internet activity. This means that law
enforcement and governmental agencies would not only have to apply for access to the IPAR’s
information, they would also have to request and obtain a court order before they could use
the information from the IPAR for internet activity surveillance.

Supporting an IPAR means ISPs around the country must provide up-to-date information feeds
to the central IPAR. Issues concerning the security of these transactions must be identified and
addressed. On the receiving end is an agency used to receiving and protecting very confidential
information. Take, for example, the Internal Revenue Service and electronic tax filings. In
2009, more than 95 million people filed their income tax returns electronically.5 These are

4

Lithwick, Dahlia and Julia Turner. “A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 1, Should you be Scared of the Patriot Act?”
http://www.slate.com/id/2087984/ (accessed October 1, 2010).
5

KOLD, News 13®. “IRS E-File, Free File and other electronic options”, IRS.gov.
http://www.kold.com/Global/story.asp?S=1072219 (accessed October 1, 2010).
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electronic transactions that contain an individual’s social security number, date of birth,
address, annual income, and much more. To protect the confidentiality of the information
contained in these transactions, secure channels must be configured to ensure the safest
delivery of this information. As outlined by the IRS website6, safeguards include:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The IRS e-file System is not done over e-mail
The IRS e-file System has many built-in security features
The IRS e-file System employs multiple firewalls
The IRS e-file System uses state of the art virus and worm detection
The IRS e-file System meets or exceeds all government security standards
The IRS e-file System is constantly tested for weaknesses by penetration testing
All Internet transmissions will use SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) encrypted security measures.

If these methods provide secure channels for the delivery of extremely confidential tax
information, these same methods can be deployed to ensure IP address transactions to the
IPAR are also delivered safely. ISPs who feed IP data to the IPAR would be required to transmit
only packets that are encrypted. On the receiving end, the IPAR would be positioned behind
multiple firewalls that would only allow registered providers through.

Keep in mind that data being fed to the IPAR contains far less confidential information than an
electronic tax filing. The IPAR transaction contains only an IP address, along with the name and
address of the owning subscriber, and a tag to identify the submitting ISP. In a two-part
authentication scheme, this transaction would house only one part of the information needed
to discern internet usage. Usage records would still be legally protected within the ISP and/or
within internet application hosts such as Google, AOL, and Craigslist. Those entities would still

6

IRS.gov. “IRS e-file: Secure Online Tax Filing”. http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=121477,00.html (accessed
October 2, 2010).
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own the protection responsibility of the usage records of their subscribers and require court
orders in order to release the information.

ISP Support
An IPAR solution offers several advantages to service providers. Growing data retention
requirements mean ISPs have progressively taken on increasing burdens in keeping more and
more data relative to their subscribers and subscriber activity. Increasing data requirements
means increasing back-end systems that support both the storage of the data and the indexing
mechanisms to retrieve it. The more data stored, and the more data written to tape and
offsite storage, the greater the liability and risk of security breach. In addition, subscriber
information maintained by the ISP contains much more than the IP address. This data contains
all subscriber activity from usage, to payment transactions, to services including email and
wireless accounts.

Having the only systems that marry activity to IP address means ISPs face increasing pressures
to become the monitoring and policing authority for the subscribers they service. Recent
legislation implemented in the United Kingdom, known as the Digital Economy Bill, allows
authorities to not only require ISPs to monitor their subscribers’ activities, but also hinder
access for users identified as engaging in criminal activity on the internet7. With similar

7

Parr,Ben. “UK Passes Controversial Digital Economy Bill”. http://mashable.com/2010/04/07/digital-economybill/ (accessed October 3, 2010).
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legislation considerations in the United States, ISPs face ever increasing policing requirements.
An IPAR implementation helps in the delineation between provider and policing functions.

To support an IPAR implementation, providers must provide immediate data feeds to the
central IP address database. Each time a DHCP system provides an updated IP address to a
customer, the ISP must send a copy of that IP assignment, along with the name and address it is
assigned to, to the IPAR. With this method, law enforcement and government agencies no
longer need to rely on the ISP to provide IP information when policing authorities request it.
Instead, the burden of policing activity can be left in the hands of law enforcement that are
then enabled with immediate access to IP information as it is needed. Responsibility for the
policing of the internet is a definition both law enforcement and service providers agreed
needed to be defined and the IPAR helps with that designation.

In addition to the reduction of policing requirements for an ISP, an IPAR also helps by
significantly reducing the labor and systems needed for IP address and subpoena management.
The subpoena process, by itself, requires application and systems to create, index, and store
the plethora of subpoena requests received by the services providers. Legal respondents must
track incoming subpoenas, recording the information provided in response, and tracking the
processing time in order to meet legal requirements. With an IPAR providing a reduction in
subpoena requests to the ISPs, there is a corresponding expense reduction realized by the ISP
which can reduce such costs from being passed on to the consumer.
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Not all burdens are removed from an ISP however. While subpoena processing is expected to
decrease, new data-delivery systems will have to be implemented to provide transaction data
to the IPAR database. These systems would have to support real-time transmission of
dynamically or statically assigned IP addresses, provide SSL encryption of the transmitted data,
and support authentication mechanisms with the IPAR. These systems would have to comply
with 24x7x365 operations and have support staff to maintain and support them.

For data delivery to work properly, ISPs will be required to register with the IPAR to obtain an
ISP identification tag, or ISPID (eye-spid). This ISPID will be appended to IP address records in
order to identify the service provider that is providing the data. National providers that service
customers in multiple areas of the United States, such as Comcast, will be required to obtain an
ISPID for each jurisdictional area, typically defined as a major metropolitan area (such as Boston
or Los Angeles) or state (New Hampshire). Along with an ISPID, registration to the IPAR
provides the ISP with a secure tunnel to be used to submit data. This secure tunnel is provided
as a uniquely assigned IP address that is allowed through the receiving firewalls. For incoming
transactions, this incoming network IP address is matched to the ISPID on the record as a
method to twice authenticate the provider and accept the record.

Non compliance with the IPAR registration would follow similar punitive actions and fines as is
true for non-compliance with data retention requirements. While ISPs could be assessed a
registration fee to obtain an ISPID, greater cost emphasis would be placed on non-compliance
penalties to encourage proper use of the IPAR.
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Law Enforcement and Government Agencies

In an interview with Detective Sergeant Lang of the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit8, I
asked what it was that law enforcement really needed from an ISP. He listed these items:

•

Easier access to information. Of particular interest is access to name and service
address for IP address holders. While service address is critical in identifying the
location of the activity, some ISPs provide billing addresses which do not always
correspond to location information for the customer.

•

Real-time information. Sergeant Lang cited a recent incident where a suicide threat
was uncovered on a website posting. These are situations where the information
must be expedient and accurate to the hour. He also cited other cases of death
threats where similar access to emergency information was needed.

•

Historical information. In normal investigation of computer or internet crimes, there
is often a pattern to the activity. Having the ability to identify a user, and then see
the length of time they held the IP address, or where an address was before or after,
helps in solidifying evidence. This is generally information that is not readily
available to them in the current subpoena process. Subpoenas typically ask for the
IP address for the specific event... a particular IP address at a particular date and
time.

8

Lang, Glen. Phone interview with Sergeant Lang, Maine State Computer Crimes Unit. 6 October 2010.
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•

Access to information that has been otherwise unobtainable. Certain small
providers have been unable to keep up with the technological growth required to
meet the subpoena requests. These small companies “never provide a response”,
according to Lang, leaving them no method to investigate criminal activity within
those service areas. Another instance involved a large company that had recently
filed bankruptcy. Bankruptcy rulings did not mandate the company comply with
prior subpoena reporting requirements, thus all requests for information were being
returned as ‘no records’.

What recourse is there for these entities that do not comply with internet service data
requirements? The most common recourse for providers who do not maintain records is to
require them to appear in court as the ‘custodians of record’. If the records are not provided
electronically or physically, then the provider can be summoned to court to personally appear
to testify to the data requested. If the records are not provided or maintained however, then
an appearance serves little purpose other than to discomfort the ISP. A provider, with no
records to substantiate the evidence, bears little credence in the hearings.

These requests from law enforcement remain consistent. They need improved and timelier
access to information, easier methods to identify activity related to copyright infringement and
child endangerment, and improved support for emergency situations. Without access to such
information, law enforcement has no recourse but to require the providers to provide the
missing information. Lines relative to policing responsibilities are grayed as a result. The IPAR

21
enables law enforcement the control to police activity and set more definitive boundaries on
responsibilities for the policing functions, where law enforcement is the best trained to do so.

There is an additional benefit inherent in the IPAR relative to law enforcement. While cyber
investigators need quick access to information, they must also continue to follow proper access
methods to obtain it. This IPAR format provides continued support of the process for search
and seizure of computer equipment. The ‘internet’ by itself cannot instigate a crime. It is
nothing but an access highway and it is the users of this road that are using it appropriately or
not. The goal for investigators is to narrow down the activity to a point where they can
reasonably request a warrant for the retrieval of computer equipment. Access ultimately to the
computer where the crimes occurred it key. The perpetrator’s computer can, by itself, be
deemed as contraband. By definition, contraband is any property that it is illegal to produce or
possess9. When that computer contains child pornography which is illegal to own, the computer
is now deemed contraband and meets the criteria as illegal to possess. The computer can also
be the ‘instrument’ of a crime. If the computer was used in the creation of illegal pornography,
or used to download copyrighted material, or used to hack into a database, it is now actual tool
or ‘weapon’ used to commit a crime. In an online criminal investigation this is the true end
target to conclude the investigation. Obtaining access to that final computer, however, falls
under very specific guidelines for search and seizure.

When online activity is identified, law enforcement today has to subpoena the ISP to identify
the owner of the IP address in question. In an IPAR concept, law enforcement can obtain that
9

Contraband. Legal definition of Contraband by the Free Online Dictionary. http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/contraband. (accessed November 2, 2010).
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information from the IPAR database removing the lengthy subpoena process. This IPAR data is
important for other reasons far beyond expedited access. IPAR allows greater compliance
acceptability and a more consistent format to the investigative data that will eventually be
provided in the criminal proceedings. Depending upon the ISP and their system capabilities,
respondent data can come in a variety of forms. Less sophisticated providers have fewer data
reporting options and may be able to provide little supporting evidence other than their
statement. Subpoena responses can vary significantly between providers. IPAR helps to
eliminate inconsistencies as the data returned in a query is identical from one investigation to
another.

Similar to records obtained from the Department of Motor Vehicles database, consistency in
form and content is valuable in provided improved credibility to the records. Obtaining data
from a secure, registered entity like the IPAR reduces the likelihood that IP address evidence
would be inadmissible. It provides a method to standardize the evidence record going forward.
This is important when criminal investigations reach the critical juncture of search and seizure.
According to Sgt. Lang, the end computer can be the most critical piece of evidence tying
together the records from the ISP and records from their investigation. The process to seize the
equipment, however, can be more difficult than the original subpoena for information. The key
difference is that seizure requires a warrant and warrants differ greatly from subpoenas. In the
subpoena process agencies are asking to be provided information. In a warrant, agencies are
asking for permission to go get it. It is the difference between ‘please send it to me’ and ‘I’m
coming to take it’. This makes the legal process of search and seizure more stringent and
therefore the IPAR more helpful.
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Obtaining a search warrant requires a judge or magistrate to provide a written order to search
and obtain physical property or assets. These are only granted in criminal investigations and
require investigators prove probable cause that there is substantiated evidence enough to
approve the search. Proving probable cause requires submission of a formal affidavit along
with the evidence gathered during the investigation. Evidence can vary from case to case even
when the cases themselves are very similar. Submissions of report data from the IPAR allow a
single format and consistent method to tie users to IP addresses when obtaining warrants. Any
synergy can improve the success of determining probable cause. IPAR data is coming from a
state secured entity, very similar to motor vehicle records submitted in criminal hearings, giving
it the proper credence to validate the warrant request. In a fully functional IPAR
implementation this extract can become the standard for IP address identity evidence.

Beyond the requirements of individual law enforcement requests are several federal
requirements relative to law enforcement, lawful intercept of data, and CALEA compliance.
CALEA, which stands for the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, is a law
enacted in the United States in 1994 .. “To amend title 18, United States Code, to make clear a
telecommunications carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for Law
Enforcement purposes, and for other purposes.”10 Often called the ‘wiretapping law’, CALEA
brought about several important compliance rules relative to ISPs and accessibility to data.
Keeping in mind that wiretapping in 1994 was primary comprised of tapping into copper lines
and interception of traditional voice traffic, very quickly this requirement transitioned into
interception of VoIP and data packets on mostly IP networks. Beyond the needs to produce
10

CALEA – Definition. wordIQ.com. http://wordiq.com/definition/CALEA (accessed November 3, 2010).
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records in response to legal requests, CALEA brought about a new requirement for ISPs to
enable interception of real time call or data exchanges.

While CALEA attempted to provide law enforcement with improved access to real-time call
detail data, it was very slow to implement. Carriers networks in the mid-90’s were fairly open
to interception by their very architecture making carriers slow to accommodate structural
changes relative to compliance on this new initiative. By 2004, the United States Department
of Justice filed a petition to expedite compliance requirements of the carriers to give them a
deadline to meet the requirements of the original law. At that time most carriers were
transitioning to VoIP architectures bringing new sets of challenges for law enforcement relative
to interception of data, and forcing heightened demands for compliance with the new law. In
response, CALEA laws were updated in 2006 to mandate a compliance deadline of May 14,
2007 for carriers and ISPs.11 This adopted “Second Report and Order” of 2006 also defined the
responsibility of development and implementation costs as being solely on the carriers and
ISPs. While the financial responsibilities were now defined as a cost for the providers, the new
Order also went on to allow carriers the use of third parties providers to assist in meeting the
deadline and reporting requirements. Most importantly, this new revision of CALEA defined
broadband and VoIP providers as “telecommunication carriers” making the final designation
that new broadband providers and traditional telephony carriers were now combined under
the same classification relative to data intercept and collection.

11

FCC 06-56. Federal Communication Commission. “Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
Order”, May 3, 2006. http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-56A1.pdf (accessed November
7, 2010).

25
Compliance with this new CALEA requirement involved many technological changes to service
providers. The concept of ‘intercept’ meant carriers had to provide a method for law
enforcement to intercept subscriber’s real-time communication. This was achieved by either
installing intercept hardware that would allow agencies to tap into communication whenever
needed, or installing forwarding devices that automatically transmitted intercepted data to law
enforcement while simultaneously forwarding that traffic along to the intended party. Neither
of these endeavors was easy or inexpensive. While ISPs complained about uncompensated
costs, new third-party providers arose whose purpose was to manage CALEA compliance and
intercept processes for the ISPs. Interception and legal compliance, both from a hardware and
a reporting perspective, could now be outsourced.

The premise of intercept and outsourcing also plays a role with the implementation of the IPAR.
Legal compliance for intercept had a deadline of May of 2007, which means a majority of
providers now have some method to provide intercept data to law enforcement. This concept
of intercept works hand in hand with IP data routing to the IPAR. The process of forwarding
intercept data to law enforcement is very similar to the process of forwarding IP address
assignments to the IPAR. The IPAR adds a unique verification point between the intercepted
real-time communication and the confirmation of the identity of the subscribers that initiate
that communication. Real-time data in the IPAR provides a legal method to substantiate the
intercept data being forwarded to law enforcement. With the right systems in place,
government agencies could integrate the data from the two systems into one comprehensive
and inclusive record of data identity and activity.
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New third-party providers that offer CALEA compliance services can also integrate well with the
IPAR. Since the introduction of intercept in 2004, several providers of compliance services have
emerged with some offering hardware intercept services and others providing a full sweep of
legal compliance processes and services. One such provider, Neustar®, touts the following: “Our
expert systems account for and track jurisdictional distinctions and nuances of all 50 states and
all federal agencies and courts – uniformly applying them to each demand for customer
records.”12 In addition they offer:

•

A defined strategy and turn-key solution for end-to-end CALEA compliance for voice,
VoIP and broadband internet service.

•

A primary interface to the LEAs (law enforcement agencies) and prosecutors when a
challenge to an order’s validity is required, or if a clarification of scope and
reasonableness is necessary.

While Neustar is not unique in these offerings, of importance here are the specifics to
broadband providers and the existing interface to law enforcement. For the ISP, if third parties
such as Neustar now have the ability to intercept traffic, they also have the ability to integrate
with the ISP for purposes of collecting and forwarding data to the IPAR. This is a critical offering
for providers who can’t meet the requirements for providing data to the IPAR whether due to
cost or technical challenges. Having to be compliant with intercept requirements means
providers had to be ready for integration methods such as those offered by a company like
Neustar. These services can be utilized for the ISP beyond the intercept requirement and
12
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provide an alternate method of getting data transferred to the IPAR. As stated above, Neustar
also purports to understand the ‘jurisdictional nuances’ of all 50 states. This aligns well with
the state-based format of the IPAR and dissecting the data into the proper jurisdictional units.
For smaller ISPs, third party providers can be the key in completing integration with the IPAR.

Additionally, having functionality through third party vendors means companies like Neustar
can offer an additional service. While Neustar is being used as the mediator for the intercept
process with law enforcement, they can also extract IP address information, integrating the two
processes into one. The benefits here are two fold. For the ISP, the IPAR process can be
outsourced to a provider that has already met the authorization guidelines for collecting and
processing sensitive legal information. Outsourcing could be more cost effective for the ISP, in
particular if they are already using an outside source for intercept functionality. Beyond the
ISP benefits, there could be a significant opportunity in having the two processes married
within the same third party outsourcer. Having the existing functionality to intercept and
collect real-time communication means providers like Neustar also have the ability to link that
data to the IPAR, forming one complete record of activity and IP address assignment. While
integrating this data isn’t necessarily of interest to the provider themselves, it is critical
information for the government agencies at the receiving end of the intercept data. These third
parties could provide an interim database service, which sits between the IPAR and the
intercept systems, providing a very unique and all-inclusive service for law enforcement.
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Lastly, beyond the opportunity for data integration, most of these third parties additionally
offer subpoena and legal compliance services. This could make them a possible one-stop-shop
for ISPs as coverage for all law enforcement compliance initiatives. Services include:

•

Court ordered records production

•

Legal and / or customer notifications

•

Records retention

•

Legal process wording

While fulfilling the obligations of providing timely IP data to the IPAR, third party providers
could complete the entire outside intercept and legal document processing functionality,
offering a critical service of integrated data for law enforcement and reducing the burden on
the ISPs.

Legislative Reforms

While law enforcement embraced rules such as CALEA, privacy advocates complained about the
open ability for the government to tap-at-will. Adding the growing concerns of internet
security, legislatures have worked for more than a decade, to define rules to regulate the use
and activity of the open and unrestricted internet. Without having any control on the physical
or network layers that comprise the internet, law makers were left with limited alternatives
other than to require service and application providers to be the mechanism for obtaining
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information. How does an IPAR concept impact both present and future legislation relative to
IP address information, internet activity, and subscriber protection? Let’s review some current
legislation and the impact to them in an IPAR implementation.

Laws established in Nevada and Minnesota require Internet Service Providers to keep
information regarding their customers private, unless a customer specifically approves their
information can be given out13. In a retail environment, stores can link your transactions
through various databases and record your name, purchase trends, credit status, even the
shelves you are more likely to purchase from. This law was intended to prevent ISPs from
participating in this collaboration of subscriber purchases, in particular where a majority of
commerce was shifting to online transactions. Whenever a consumer visits a website, makes a
purchase or searches for information, that activity can be linked to the specific person. ISPs
have far greater access to this information because the information is traveling across their
network and comes from customers who are granted access through their IP subscriptions.
These laws do not change with the IPAR. ISPs must continue to protect the confidentiality of
their subscribers’ activity. Instead the IPAR redirects activity monitoring back to the policing
agencies further supporting this law for privacy protection.

In similar rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion on the privacy rights of
computer users, that computer users have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the
personal information they give to their ISPs. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that ISP

13

Blanke, Jordan M. “Minnesota passes the nation’s first Internet privacy law”. Rutgers Computer & Technology
Law Journal, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/106474530.html (accessed September 26,
2010).
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subscriber records can only be disclosed to law enforcement upon the issuance of a
subpoena14. While the IPAR reduces the need for the subpoena to the ISP, law enforcement
would not be able to obtain personally identifiable information unless first being granted
permissible use to the repository. This protection of personal information can continue to be
supported under an IPAR design as the user’s personally-identifiable information remains
secured and only the database that houses the information is changed.

In a similar manner, Minnesota also prohibits Internet service providers from disclosing
personally identifiable information. The Minnesota laws include a consumer's physical or
electronic address, telephone number, Internet or online sites visited, or any of the contents of
a consumer's data storage devices15. They offer provisions under certain circumstances where
information must be disclosed, such as to a grand jury, to a state or federal law enforcement
officer acting as authorized by law, or pursuant to a court order or court action. This is
legislation that can be fully supported under an IPAR implementation. The IPAR helps define
the segregation of duties between the provider of the service and the keepers of record.
Pursuant to investigation and judicial request, the IPAR provides authorities with access to tie
an IP address to a user, while policing agencies link internet use to criminal activity.

14
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As outlined in previous pages, the parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Digital
Economy Bill16 earlier this year. Here is a law that is controversial because it is among the first
to dictate that monitoring of subscriber activity as a task for the ISPs. Not only were ISPs
required to monitor their subscribers’ activities but they were also required to prevent access
for users identified as engaging in criminal activity on the internet. For the first time, service
providers are mandated as having both the policing and punitive roles. The ruling is mired with
a lack of definition. How does the service provider differentiate between appropriate versus
inappropriate activity? If certain sites are always ‘inappropriate’, wouldn’t it be easier for the
ISP to simply block them and prevent the monitoring, logging and reporting that would come
along with them? The implications for both ISPs and subscribers are concerning.

The IPAR eliminates the need for such legislation for service providers in the United States.
Law enforcement agencies with the training and skills needed for policing are empowered to
police by being granted access to IP information when it is determined to be needed. Instead
of logging millions of transaction records for all subscribers’ activities in the event one engages
in criminal activity, the criminal activity is identified first, then the subscriber that is engaging in
that activity is identified and monitored. It is a more efficient use of systems and provides the
delineation between the highway and the traffic cops.

Other legislative reforms have touched areas such as record retention, censorship, and 1st
Amendment rights such as the freedom of speech. In 1996 the Electronic Communication
Transactional Records Act was passed by Congress. While this Act covered the right of the
16

Parr, Ben. “UK Passes Controversial Digital Economy Bill.” http://mashable.com/2010/04/07/digital-economybill/. (accessed October 3, 2010).

32
Federal Government (or governmental entity as described in the ECTRA) to request the
contents of electronic or wired communication from ISPs, it also established guidelines for the
length of time requested records would be retained17. Typically that retention period is defined
as 90 days for any records requested via subpoena or court order from a service provider. If a
legal entity requests data via court order, not only is the ISP required to respond to the request,
the response and accompanying data must be preserved for a period of 90 days after the
request is fulfilled. This is different than the historical two year retention of subscriber data.
The two year record retention period means a legal entity can make reasonable assumptions
that a subscriber’s information will be available for the previous 24-month period. This
directive means a request of subscriber information dated 12/25/10 should produce records on
this customer that go back to 12/25/08. While the 90-day retention period would continue
unaltered with the IPAR, the two year retention period would no longer be needed.

Even with the IPAR, the preservation order relative to subscriber data or subscriber activity
remains as a mandated area of compliance when records are subpoenaed. Legal proceedings
can take many months or even years to conclude thus there cannot be a risk of loss of data for
anything requested in a legal case. Regardless of the existence of the IPAR, the 90 day
retention period must be upheld. The IPAR, however, does negate the need to keep two years
worth of subscriber IP data. This would now be redundant data to what exists within the IPAR.
The implications from a legislative perspective would alter portions of the Electronic
Transactional Records Act. One specific example for data retention guidelines states: “Data

17
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should be retained in such a way as to avoid their being retained more than once...18” This
emphasizes the redundancy of the data now being maintained in the IPAR and support for the
retention requirements to move to an IPAR-only requirement.

Other legislative guidelines are less defined. Several reforms, such as the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA)19 and the United States Cable Act (CA)20 try to incorporate
rules for notification when subscriber identifiable information is provided to law enforcement
agencies. The establishment of the IPAR would drastically alter this principle and force changes
to these notification provisions. With the Cable Act established in 1984 as a method to regulate
cable services, it was not prepared for the transition that occurred when cable providers
transitioned to providing internet services over their hybrid coaxial fiber networks. As such,
under the Cable Act, there are definitions outlined when breaches occur relative to customer
information, however there are not specific provisions relative to internet services or customer
specific information in relation to internet usage through the cable provider. There is, however,
guidance dictated under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, which is more specifically
directed to any provider who ‘sends or receives electronic communication’21. Considering that
this Act was established in 1986, the definition of ‘electronic communication’ during the last 25
18
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years has changed drastically. While district courts are still divided on whether these acts still
meet the needs of the present technology, they differ in what is defined for notification
processes relative to customer private information. The CA defines notification requirements
whenever information is provided to law enforcement. The other, the ECPA, defines that
notification is not required and providers are exempt from liability. Which one then applies to
present day service providers and would either apply to the IPAR?
Looking at a recent copy of Comcast Corporation’s Customer Privacy Notice, the policy makes
specific reference to the Cable Act as follows: “As a subscriber to cable service or other services
provided by Comcast, you are entitled under Section 631 of the federal Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, as amended, (the “Cable Act”) to know the following22:

•

the limitations imposed by the Cable Act upon cable operators in the collection and
disclosure of personally identifiable information about subscribers;

•

the nature of personally identifiable information we collect;

•

the nature of the use of personally identifiable information;

•

under what conditions and circumstances we may disclose personally identifiable
information and to whom;

•

the period during which we maintain personally identifiable information;

•

the times and place at which you may have access to your personally identifiable
information; and

•

your rights under the Cable Act concerning personally identifiable information and its
collection and disclosure.

22
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Comcast’s privacy notice goes on to reference the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
includes the following verbiage:
“In addition, Section 702 of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, (the
“Telecommunications Act”) provides additional privacy protections for certain information
related to our phone services:
•
•

information about the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and
amount of your use of the phone services; and
information contained on your telephone bill concerning the phone services you receive.

That phone information, when matched to your name, address, and telephone number is known
as customer proprietary network information or CPNI for short. This notice, which includes our
CPNI Policy, describes what CPNI information we obtain, how we protect it, and how it may be
used. If you are a customer of our phone services, you have the right, and Comcast has a duty,
under the Telecommunications Act, to protect the confidentiality of CPNI.23
A full copy of Comcast Corporation’s Privacy Notice is included in Addendum B.

While there are multiple legislative references in this privacy policy example from Comcast, the
primary reference point for the treatment of confidential data in this document is the Cable
Act. A fully functioning IPAR now implies changes not only to the definitions within these
defined rulings, but also in numerous privacy policy statements that make reference to their
compliance with these notification policies.

For customer notification principles in relation to the IPAR, the most applicable approach is for
customers to be made aware that the IPAR exists. While information about a customer’s
internet usage is not disclosed, their IP information is being sent to database that law
enforcement can access at any time. Again using the motor vehicle analogy, citizens are aware
23
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that their license and vehicle information is contained in the DMV database and is available for
law enforcement to access at any time. The principle with the IPAR would be no different.
Consumers are made aware of the existence of this new application and that the scope of
access is restricted only to approved law enforcement and governmental agencies. Wording
within legislative texts would have to be modified to outline specifications for conformity with
the IPAR and this new compliance requirement for service providers. Modifications to
individual privacy policies would then outline the ISPs mandate for submission to the IPAR, the
ISPs ongoing protection of the confidentiality of consumer information, and specifications of
IPAR restrictions for use to law enforcement.

Following typical guidelines for privacy policies, here are some expected changes that would be
relevant to each section of a privacy policy once the IPAR is implemented:

•

Describe what information is being collected online. Under this heading there would be
a change to specify the collection of IP address information. The Comcast example
outlines the collection of name, service/billing address, e-mail address, telephone
number, driver’s license number, social security number, bank account number, credit
card number, and ‘other similar account information’. IP Address should be listed as
specific collected data. While it could be assumed to be included under the ‘other
similar account information’ heading, it would be more appropriate to list it individually
given the nature of IP address confidentiality concerns.

•

Describe how collected information is shared. Here changes would outline how IP data
is fed to the IPAR and the regulatory requirements to do so. Data is shared
automatically, at the time the IP address is assigned, and shared to a secure federal and
/ or state mandated repository for law enforcement and governmental purposes.

•

Describe choices available to consumers regarding marketing use of this collected
information. There should be no marketing use for a consumer’s IP address thus this
should be specifically outlined. While other information such as name, address, and
phone number may be provided for marketing purposes, and is specifically defined in
this section, IP address information would not be included in that distribution. This
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would follow similar treatment for non disclosure of customer social security number
information for marketing purposes. As for choices to consumers, there is no option to
‘opt out’ of submission to the IPAR so specifics on opt-out options would have to
delineate the exception for IPAR submission.
•

Describe the consumer’s right of inquiry about their own information. Typically
consumers can request copies of their own information from service providers including
copies specific to the individual privacy policy. This would be true of the IPAR as well.
Consumers would have the ability to request their own records from the IPAR, in the
same way consumers can request copies of their driving records from the Department
of Motor Vehicle. Verbiage specific to this option for consumers should be outlined in
this section of the privacy policy including links for the consumer to request such IPAR
data.

•

Describe how personal information is protected online. This section remains consistent
with existing privacy statements and should not require modifications to accommodate
the IPAR.

The changes documented here help to outline how far reaching the IPAR would be relative to
existing legislative policies and company guidelines on compliance with these policies. Another
example is the Customer Proprietary Network Information or CPNI as referenced in the above
Comcast privacy notice. CPNI requirements were implemented as part of the 1996 US
Telecommunications Act24. Modifications to this act gave the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) the sole authority for determining how to regulate the use of information
collected about a consumer’s telephone calls. While this new consumer protection order was
intended to cover items that are commonly found on any telephone bill such as the time, date,
destination and duration of every call, it targets specific use of this collected data by telephone
providers and how or if it can be shared. Similar to the Cable Act, this legislation was originally

24

Federal Communications Commission. “Telecommunications Act of 1996.” http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html
(accessed October 4, 2010).
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targeted at telephone carriers who were, at that time, providing primarily copper-based,
hardwired telephone services. As a majority of the carriers migrated to IP-based networks and
services, certain portions of this CPNI definition remained stagnant and required modification.
A common argument on the VoIP architecture refers to the IP address and corresponding mac
address that are both part of the initiation session for a call. As such, do IP and mac address
information fall under CPNI protection guidelines specific to telephone communication? If so,
how does the existence of the IPAR modify the text of the existing rules?

The privacy policy of RidgeviewTel LLC provides a good outline of how CPNI and IP address data
can be combined into one consolidated form. Their policy states: “Every computer connected
to the Internet is assigned a unique number known as an Internet protocol (IP) address. Since
these numbers are usually assigned in location-based blocks, an IP address can often be used to
identify the area from which a computer is connecting to the Internet. This information can be
used by governmental authorities or RidgeviewTel for legal purposes such as tracing criminal
acts and responding to emergencies.”25 A policy such as this does provide disclosure to the
consumer as to how IP address information can be used. While the IP address is not defined
specifically under CPNI rules, it does fall under CPNI guidelines when it is married to customer
identifiable information, and this is exactly what the IPAR does. As such, this would indicate
that the IPAR should fall under those same legal requirements. It opens an interesting prospect
of the government having to regulate itself if they are the ones that ultimately own the IPAR
data.

25

RidgeviewTel™ LLC. “Privacy Policy”. http://www.myridgeviewtel.com/site-policy.php (accessed December 27,
2010).
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Migration to IPv6

A majority of the addressing process in use today, and outlined here, is specific to the current
world-wide implementation of IPv4. As the ‘v4’ indicates, our present IP standard is based on
the fourth version of IP deployment. This standard, as outlined in RFC791, was defined in 1981
and is based upon a 32 bit address, made up of four 8-bit octets.26 The four octets are used
together to define IP address classes, and further determine bit allocations for network and
node designators within the 32 bits. Using this combination of network and host bits, IPv4’s 32
bit address can support more than 4 billion unique, usable IP addresses. While this seems like a
sufficiently large number, when dissected across the global internet it is not nearly enough to
support all users or systems. Considering the top 5 countries with the highest number of
internet users, as shown in the table below, this range of addressing in IPv4 is shown to have
already been exceeded in just China alone:
TOP 5 COUNTRIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBER OF INTERNET USERS
Population,
Internet Users % Population
Growth % of World
Ranking
Country
2010 Est
Latest Data (Penetration) 2000-2010
Users
1
China
1,330,141,295
420,000,000
0.32
17.67
0.21
2
United States
310,232,863
239,893,600
0.77
1.52
0.12
3
Japan
126,804,433
99,143,700
0.78
1.11
0.05
4
India
1,173,108,018
81,000,000
0.07
15.20
0.04
5
Brazil
201,103,330
75,943,600
0.38
14.19
0.04
TOP 5 Countries
3,141,389,939
915,980,900
NOTES: World Internet User Statistics were updated for June 30, 2010. The most recent user information comes
from data published by Nielsen Online, International Telecommunications Union, Official country reports, and
other trustworthy research sources. Data from this site may be cited, giving due credit and establishing an active
27
link back to Internet World Stats. Copyright © 2000 - 2010, Miniwatts Marketing Group. All rights reserved.
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Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California. Internet Protocol. Darpa Internet Program
Protocol Specification. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt (accessed January 2011).
27

World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats. “Internet Usage Statistics, The Internet Big
Picture.” http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed October 11, 2010).
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This means the migration to the next version of IP addressing, IPv6, is inevitable, and in
actuality fast approaching. What does this upcoming transition to IPv6 mean to an IPAR
implementation and does this migration have positive or negative impacts to its deployment?
Let’s start by looking at the inherent differences between IPv4 and IPv6.

IPv6 extends the IP address from 32 bits in IPv4 to 128 bits. This means if IPv6 was fully
deployed across the entirety of Internet / network space, it would support 3.4x1038 usable IP
addresses, or 3.40 undecillion (36 zeros) addresses. While this exponentially expands the
distribution of IP addresses available for use, it also changes the format of IP addresses. IPv4
addresses are configured in the 32 bit, dotted decimal notation we are now familiar with:
192.168.2.10 which translates at the bit level to 11000000.10101000.00000010.00001010. IPv6
uses a completely different format for the IP address, breaking the address into eight 4-digit
hexadecimal octets, separated by colons (xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx). Because the
address is hexadecimal as opposed to binary, the x values in the address can range from 0’s to
f’s (0000 – ffff) or up to 16 different values per x placeholder. Comparing an IPv4 address to its
new IPv6 format we see:

IPv4: 192.168.2.10
IPv6: 2002:C0A8:20A:0:0:0:0:0
If this IPv6 was then transcribed into an URL for use on the internet it would appear as:
http://[ 2002:C0A8:20A::]:80/index.html
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So what does this mean to the IPAR? Foremost, it means the IPAR must be able to support
both the syntax of the IPv4 address as well as the IPv6 address format simultaneously. The
transition to IPv6 can be time-consuming, having to configure all devices to the new protocol,
and does not come without upgrade costs as older devices and software may required
upgrading to support IPv6. As such, the transition to IPv6 will not be a quick one, but will
instead be a migration that occurs over a considerable period of time. This means the systems
to support the IPAR must also be fully IPv6 compatible and also able to support incoming data
that is either IPv4 or IPv6 based.

The impending transition to IPv6 means the IPAR must also be sized to accommodate the
growing number of IP-based users expected in the next 10 years. Considering only subscribers
in the United States, the previous table shows nearly 240 million internet users as of June 2010.
At the date of inception of the IPAR, it would need to be sized to support at least half of those
records. This number is based on the point in time that the database is live to the time it takes
for providers to modify their systems to direct IP changes to it, as well as the number of
changes to subscriber’s information that will occur from that point in time forward. Next,
assuming these users changed their IP addresses only one time in the first year, the IPAR would
have to support a possibility of 200 million records in short order. Given that the true number
of IP address changes per subscriber is much higher than one per annum... having to account
for new users, moves, service changes, periods of inactivity, and system upgrades... the sizing of
the IPAR is significant. The transition to IPv6 itself will generate significant numbers of address
changes for subscribers which would need to be reflected within the sizing of the IPAR.
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Wireless Migration to 4G

Looking forward only 10 years, we need to consider the changes to the wireless industry that
are making it the new industry standard for ‘any service anywhere’. The growth of wireless
mobile devices continues to grow exponentially as users transition away from hardwired
systems to go-with-you applications. Service providers are merging IP into telephony, video
and other applications. Start a movie at home, and watch it on your cell phone as you leave
home. Surf the internet on your TV. Integrate your VoIP home phone to your cell phone, to
your computer, to your TV. This isn’t a world of tomorrow; it is the reality of today. What it
means at the technical level is that more and more applications are moving to IP space and
mobile providers are transitioning to all-IP deployments.

The current platform for wireless service is based upon 3G technology, or the third generation
of mobile environment. 3G was originally based upon the telecommunication industry, most
specifically the traditional telephony carriers, and their existing circuit switched cellular
networks. While good for providing for its generation of mobility, it was based on an older and
slower technology. The newer, fourth generation network or 4G, is based on a packet switched
network which offers higher speeds and greater integration of services and applications.
Packet switched networks are IP based, using source and destination addresses in small sized
packets to route data across networks from one node to another. Implementing this into the
wireless space means a greater integration of applications to mobile devices and exponentially
expanded use of IP addressing in the wireless world. The impending migration to 4G means the
ultimate transition to an all-IP based wireless environment.
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Why is the migration to all-IP important in the wireless space and how is this relevant to the
IPAR? Consider the number of IP addresses in use in the typical home environment. A
subscriber receives a modem from their provider which requires, by itself, one IP address. The
subscriber is then generally provided with up to 5 usable IP addresses. This is a fairly static
value, providing for connectivity to one or two PCs, a gaming system, and perhaps an Internet
capable TV. Once assigned and configured for use through the provider, the number of IP
addresses cannot be exceeded and the lease duration of these IP addresses is fairly stagnant.
The wireless realm operates a bit differently.

As is true of wired ISPs, IP address scopes vary by provider. In a 4G world each mobile device is
provided an IP address from its carrier, but that mobile space is shared from one provider to
the other. This shared mobile space allows a user to drive from one end of the country to
another and maintain reasonably stable connectivity as they transition from one provider to the
other, from one cell tower to the next. As the mobile user transitions from one carrier network
to another, their IP address moves along with them.
The most notable relevance of this migration to 4G networks is that this technology enables the
convergence of the wired networks to wireless. IP-based applications and services that had
been, for the most part, isolated to the wired network are now fully functional in the realm of
the mobile device. The adaptation of this new generation of technology only heightens the
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depletion of IPv4 address ranges and hastens the requirement for full migration to IPv6. New
specifications of 4G devices require IPv6 addressing28.
An IPAR system offers significant improvements to wireless providers. Data requirements for
this subset of providers can be more involved than for traditional wired providers. For a typical
ISP, personally identifiable information for a subscriber consists of the IP address in use and the
physical address on file for that subscriber. Though that is also true of the wireless subscriber...
this IP address is assigned to this customer at this address... the subscriber is mobile thus their
actual location will vary. For the purposes of successful law enforcement, the identifiable
information for the physical location where the activity originated can be difficult to obtain. If
an internet crime takes place for a wired customer, it is fairly easy for law enforcement to
obtain the location of the activity from the provider. When that internet crime takes place on
an IP enabled mobile device, the positioning location of the device can be an important
component of law enforcement’s investigation. As outlined in an interview with Sergeant
Glenn Lang of the Maine State Computer Crimes Unit, “..in our typical child pornography case
the location is secondary by far to the name of the subscriber. In most of these cases the
location is not very important because they generally need or want privacy to upload or
download contraband. That is almost always home. If it’s a harassment or missing person case
the location is the vital part of the investigation. Wireless devices in general have created a lot
of problems for us...”29

28

Wikipedia.com. “IPv4 address exhaustion.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion (accessed
December 27, 2010).
29

Lang, Glen. Phone interview. Sergeant Glen Lang, Maine State Computer Crimes Unit. (6 Oct. 2010).
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Sergeant Lang outlines an important separation in information needed between the wired and
wireless worlds. As such, an IPAR would either have to account for both scenarios, as both will
be submitting data to the repository, or provide alternative methods separating the two types
of providers. As previously indicated, for traditional wired ISPs location information will consist
of the address on file for the subscriber. For wireless providers, the location information would
include similar data relative to the physical address of the subscriber, however, location
information relative to the mobile positioning of the cellular device when the IP address was
assigned would have to be either appended as part of the data stream or omitted and provided
in a separate request.
To determine the best approach for this discrepancy in location information, let’s go back to the
original concept of the IPAR. The IPAR is based on a similar model to a freeway, toll charges,
and vehicle license plate information. These represent the Internet (freeway), the service
provider (toll charges) and the web-enabled user (license plate). Highway users are mobile in
the same way wireless customers are mobile. The highway authority is not concerned with the
location of the cars on the highway, only that they have paid the toll fees to use it. Law
enforcement is the entity concerned with location of the vehicles, but like the toll taker, they
are not concerned with the location of every vehicle on the highway as this is far too much data
for them to digest. Instead they are concerned with the location of the vehicle only when an
incident occurs. This lends to a sound conceptual approach to the IPAR. Location of the
subscriber, or in this model the address of the vehicle’s registration, is a mandatory inclusion in
the data stream from the provider to the IPAR. Various mobile locations of the subscriber are
too changing and would overburden the IPAR when the mobile location is really only important
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when an incident occurs. As a method to avoid collecting millions of unnecessary records for
wireless providers, the positioning location information for the mobile user would not need to
be fed real time to the IPAR. This information would continue to fall under the standard
subpoena process and be requested only when needed, only when an incident or event
warrants this information relative to investigation. This method enables a uniform format for
the data feed to the IPAR regardless of provider. Law enforcement would still have real-time
access to the owner/user of an IP address and could subpoena additional information from the
provider when needed.
This continued migration to 4G by the wireless carriers offers these carriers added benefits
from the existence of an IPAR. As outlined above, the transition from 3G to 4G technology
represents the continued transition from circuit-switched to packet-switched technology. This
is the migration from the traditional telephony carrier model to the IP-enabled internet model.
Mobile devices are completing their migration from cellular telephony devices to internet
enabled, application converged devices. These are no longer phones but instead are small
portable computers. This is an opportune time for an IPAR implementation.
Looking back five years ago, Verizon Wireless would have been subpoenaed for phone records.
The future for Verizon will include being subpoenaed for internet usage records of their mobile
devices. Instead of continuing to develop high capacity systems internally to support this
changing data and meet this new data retention model, they could instead feed subscriber IP
information to the IPAR.
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The Implementation

With the conceptual model of the IPAR defined, the next step in its development is the
determination of the sizing and ultimate feasibility of the actual operating model. This outline
needs to account for the number of transactions, their content, systems sizing and database
components. As with any database, there is a threshold between storage and retrieval where
there is an incremental degradation in functionality when the number of records grows so large
that indexing and lookups become too delayed for reasonable use. This balance between
storage and retrieval has to be accounted for in the design as this is inherently going to be a
very large database. There must also be methods to ensure high levels of security given the
sensitivity of the data and the targeted segment of users that will be allowed access to the data.
As defined above, there should also be accommodations for the long term migration to a full
IPv6 environment, meaning the system must be able to support two distinct IP record formats
for the unforeseeable future. Finally, every backend data storage system needs an intuitive
front-end interface that makes retrieval of the data fast and easy and geared toward the users
who will be using it.

For the IPAR implementation let’s begin with sizing. Based on data from June 30th, 2010, the
Internet Usage and World Population Statistics reported there were 239,232,863 internet users
in the United States30. Where the IPAR is intended only for the United States and is not a global
endeavor, this value of approximately 240 million users would be the basis for preliminary

World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats. “Internet Usage Statistics, The Internet Big
Picture.” http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed October 11, 2010).
30
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sizing. Keeping in line with our motor vehicle registration analogy, there were 255,917,664
registered vehicles in the United States according to the 2008 Bureau of Transportation
Statistics. In comparison, these values are close enough to speculate that if an existing system
can support our vehicle registration data then one likely could be sized to support IP address
assignments. The scope for sizing is still within range of reasonability.

When we begin to look at the changeability of the data the systems begin to diverge. According
to R. L. Polk & Co. the average American keeps their vehicle for 63.9 months or 5.3 years.31
Americans change their vehicles exponentially less often then they change IP addresses. This
means the motor vehicle database, which contains a similar number of users, contains data that
is relatively stagnant when compared to the changeability of IP address data. Studies from
2008 indicate that the average PC in the United States uses 5.7 distinct IP addresses per
month.32 While this 5.7 value represents only 40% of PCs (with the other 60% maintaining
much more stable IP addressing) these systems that changed their IP address during a month
did so with great frequency. The differentiation here is that the sizing for the IPAR has to
accommodate not only a formidable amount of data but frequently changing data as well.

In the technical realm of database technology, there is a term know as VLDB or Very Large
Database. This terminology helps to define databases that grow well beyond the size of the
average operating database. Wikipedia provides the following definition: “A very large
31
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database, or VLDB, is a database that contains an extremely high number of database rows, or
occupies an extremely large physical file system storage space. The most common definition of
VLDB is a database that occupies more than 1 terabyte or contains several billion rows...”33
Given the scope defined for the IPAR thus far, it meets these criteria as a VLDB. There are a
variety of hardware and software platforms that can support VLDBs and these include standard
server applications such as Microsoft SQL Server and Oracle. These applications primarily
reside on Windows or Sun based servers supporting a client/server database environment.
Microsoft SQL specifications outline support for a maximum database size of 524,272 TB of
data, 32,767 user connections and a maximum number of rows limited only by the storage
capacity of the hard drives within the server hard drives or storage network.34 This would
support the preliminary sizing for the IPAR. For very large scale applications, however,
mainframe architecture is often the selection of choice and is, not coincidentally, the platform
in use by the Department of Motor Vehicles today. Let’s look at why.
There are several features of the mainframe environment that make it the ideal platform for a
system like the IPAR. Reliability is one significant benefit. This comes grouped into a set of
native features known as RAS which stands for Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability.35
While the acronym is now commonplace, it describes one of the most purposed reasons the
Wikramanayake, G.N. and J.S. Goonetillake. “Managing Very Large Databases and Data Warehousing.”
University of Colombo School of Computing. http://www.cmb.ac.lk/academic/institutes/nilis/reports/gihan.pdf
(accessed December 22, 2010).
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mainframe environment continues its stronghold in the database market. The system
architecture offers one of the greatest uptime values in the market.36 This is achieved through
various techniques of malfunction self-detection and continued operation through system
hardware or operating system errors. Considering the always-on nature of the internet and the
collective use of the IPAR to capture that IP data, the system that houses the IPAR must offer
the highest uptime and availability possible.
Another advantage of the mainframe environment is security. In 1991 an international
standard for security went into effect know as the Evaluation Assurance Level (or EAL 1 – 7)37.
This EAL value is assessed on technology applications or systems with a numeric grading
assigned once a Common Criteria security evaluation is completed. IBM’s mainframe platform
received one of the highest levels of security certifications, EAL Level 5.38 While the numerical
designate is indicative of successful security testing, there are also other factors that provide
native security advantages to the mainframe platform. By its very platform the mainframe is
more secure than traditional environments like Microsoft. Consider it the hackability quotient.
There are far fewer programmers that possess the necessary skills to hack a mainframe
environment than those that can hack a Microsoft environment. Microsoft’s platform leaves
many holes through which a hacker can attack, erase, or siphon information and there are
many more programmers with the skills and tools to impact that environment. In a January
Radding, Alan. July 22, 2010. Big Fat Finance Blog. “Mainframe 101 for C-Level Executives.”
http://bigfatfinanceblog.com/2010/07/22/mainframe-101-for-c-level-executives/ (accessed November 12, 2010).
36
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IBM®. “IBM Security.” http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/z/advantages/security/index.html (accessed
November 12, 2010).
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2010 article by Stan King titled “Mainframe Hacking: Fact or Fiction” he assesses mainframe
security well:
“If you want proof of this claim, consider what you can find by searching news archives and
trade journals, looking for references to mainframes and data loss, hacking, security breaches,
and similar topics. Recent research included checking the archives of ComputerWorld,
InformationWeek, and The Wall Street Journal for reports of unauthorized access of any
traditional mainframe environment via userid/password exploitation, corruption of a
mainframe-based networking resource, or contamination of a mainframe system software
component. This list may sound decidedly short, but it represents the basic foundation of
mainframe safety, security, and integrity..... all computers aren’t created equal.”39
Security is likely the most important aspect of the IPAR implementation. This is a database
containing sensitive information that is intended to be restricted to law enforcement and
governmental agencies. Having a hardened system to support that data is imperative. This
would be a similar evaluation that led to the mainframe in place in support of the motor vehicle
database.
While security is critical, it is still imperative that the system be physically sized to
accommodate not only the data it will store but the number of users who will access that data
and the processing time it takes to index and access that data. Indexing of data is a critical
function and one that relies more heavily on system memory than hard drive space. One

King, Stan H. January 11, 2010. “Mainframe Hacking: Fact or Fiction?” http://www.mainframezone.com/itmanagement/mainframe-hacking-fact-or-fiction (accessed November 12, 2010).
39

52
common choke-point in very large databases is that indexing can become so large it fills system
memory to capacity, reaching a threshold where data ultimately becomes inaccessible. The
DMV model not only accounts for massive volumes of data and optimal security, the databases
themselves are additionally distributed into state and/or regional systems. The format of the
DMV model segregates both the registration management as well as the physical systems by
state which reduces the size of any one database and further reduces responsibility to the
subset of the drivers residing in the state. While each database can be queried through links to
the others, this separation of databases reduces the size of each individual database, improves
indexing and lookups having less data to sort through and also narrows the scope of data to
keep it aligned with law enforcement’s jurisdictional areas. This is an ideal model to emulate
with the IPAR.
Again following the DMV’s existing design, the IPAR system would be dissected into individual
state systems. Each of these state-level IPARs would support the customers subscribing to
internet service within each state. As an example, Time Warner Cable’s New England division
supports customers in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts40. Under this model, Time
Warner Cable would send IP data on their Maine customers to the Maine IPAR database, while
sending IP address data on their New Hampshire customers to the New Hampshire IPAR. The
records would contain a common ISPID (ISP ID) as the provider is the same for both states,
however the records would be sent to two different systems based upon the physical location
of the customer. This is a common delineation that ISPs use in scoping IP address ranges
between states or metropolitan areas, keeping the structure of the IPAR in line with current ISP
40
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and state operations. Furthermore, this model supports law enforcement entities that are
typically limited jurisdictionally by state. This structure provides the most supportive model
relative to data retrieval as the Maine police officer wouldn’t have to query through millions of
records from other states to obtain the data from their own. As is the case with the DMV and
with law enforcement relative to criminal activity, any criminal actions that cross state lines falls
under federal jurisdiction. Federal agencies would have access to all state IPARs.
The present DMV structure contains 51 separate state or territorial entities. This would then be
a configuration baseline for the IPAR with one database per state. Law enforcement entities
and state agencies would be granted specific access to their state’s IPAR, with Federal and
Governmental agencies being granted access to all IPARs.

Figure2: DMV Geographic Agencies
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With design and scope of the IPAR identified, our last systematic configuration would define the
format of the data fed to and contained in the IPAR and the querying system that enables its
access. Let’s begin with record format.

IPAR Record Format

Every data string to the IPAR will begin with the ISPID field. This field represents the ID of the
ISP that is sending the record and ultimately responsible for the IP assignment to the customer.
This ISPID number will be contained in Field 1 and is represented by a seven-digit numeric value
assigned to the ISP when registering with the IPAR. Seven numeric digits in the ISPID means the
field can support 107 unique ISP identifiers or 10 million unique values... more than enough to
accommodate the number of registered ISPs in the United States.41 The first character in this
ISPID number represents the geographic range of the ISP. 1 in the first position equates to an
ISP that is wholly contained within and serving a single state entity (ex: Vermont). A value of 4
means the ISP serves only a single, unique metropolitan area, such as New York City or Los
Angeles. A 7 represents an individual ISP that provides service across more than one state, as
was the example referenced above for Time Warner Cable’s New England division (Maine, New
Hampshire and Massachusetts). All other values for the first character in the ISPID are reserved
for future designations. The remaining 6 digits within the ISPID are sequentially assigned at the
time of registration.
41
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Field 2 in the IPAR data string, the Format Field, is a single-digit numeric value that represents
the format of the IP address. A numeric value of 4 represents an IP address that is formatted as
an IPv4 address. A numeric value of 6 indicates the IP address format is in the form of an IPv6
address. The delineation is important for various reasons. Foremost, the IPAR must be able to
support both IPv4 and IPv6 for a period well into the future as both formats will exist
concurrently for many years. In addition, the character length and format of the address varies
significantly from an IPv4 address to an IPv6 address. This means that the following field, which
will contain the actual IP address, will be a variable length, with the length of the field
dependent upon the type of IP address being sent within the string. A precursor value
designating the IP version of the address ensures proper interpretation and handling of the
subsequent value. This also ensures an easy transition to the eventual all IPv6 environment
when the Format Field can eventually discarded or dropped.

Field 3 in the IPAR data string is the IP Address. This is a variable-length, alphanumeric field
that will contain the IP address assigned to the customer.

Field 4 is an alpha field that contains the Last Name of the subscriber. This will be a fixed-width,
left adjusted field, with a predefined field length of 30 characters.

Field 5 is an alpha field that contains the First Name of the subscriber. Like Field 4, this will be a
fixed-width, left adjusted field, with a predefined field length of 30 characters.

Field 6 in the IPAR string is the zip code field and contains the zip code of the service address for
the subscriber. This will be a numeric field set to a fixed width of 5 characters. The zip code
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provides additional methods for subscriber delineation and can accomplish this in a few ways.
Of greatest importance, the zip code can provide a primary level of jurisdiction. In the example
above, where the single ISP provides service across multiple states, a zip code check point
ensures data can be segregated out to the appropriate policing authorities. A zip code for a
Maine subscriber can be distinguished from that of a New Hampshire subscriber, separating
those into the proper IPARs and proper jurisdictional entities. In addition, a zip code further
distinguishes subscribers who may share a common first and last name, such as Mary Brown.
For a police investigation, narrowing the field for inquiry is critical. When there is a trigger for
criminal activity, it is important that law enforcement is able to narrow their focus down to the
appropriate geographical area. In a metropolitan area such as New York City, that has 176
unique zip codes42, this is a valuable piece of additional information in reducing the scope of an
investigation. When used in conjunction with the leading digit in the ISPID address, which
designates the geographic range of the ISP, law enforcement enjoys better optimization of this
repository.

Field 7 is the Date Field and indicates the date that the IP address was assigned to the
customer. As a date field, this field is formatted as an all numeric, 8-digit value, with a data
format of YYYYMMDD, or 20101225. Keeping in mind the purpose of the IPAR is to provide as
close to real-time data as possible relative to IP address assignments, this is intended to be a
very accurate date value relative to the assignment and in an optimal configuration this data is
sent to the IPAR at the time the assignment is made to the customer.

Yahoo Answers.com. “How many different ZIP codes are there in New York City?”
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070320141640AAcuLmf (accessed November 3, 2010).
42
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Field 8 is the Time Field and represents the timestamp of the IP address assignment to the
subscriber. All time values will be designated on GMT or Greenwich Mean Time standard43.
9:30PM Eastern Standard Time would be represented as 02:30am GMT.

Integrating the above fields into a single data string, our format now appears as follows:
<ISPID>,<FormatField>,<IPAddress>,<LastName>,<FirstName>,<Zip>,<Date>,<Time>
The received data is interpreted in the table below.
ISPID
7722651
4722633

Format Field
4
6

IP Address
192.168.2.10
2002:C0A8:20A:0:0:0:0:0

Last Name
Ouellette
Brown

First Name
Rita
Mary

Zip
04101
11040

Date
20101225
20101107

Time
09:47:03
22:01:11

This standard format for data submission to the IPAR means no header record needs to be sent
prior to the transmission of the data string. When an IP address is allocated to a subscriber
from a dynamic pool of IP addresses, this data string, in this format, is forwarded to the IPAR for
registration within the database. Over a period of normal operations, this table is updated
numerous times with the various changes in assignments for each customer. As the data is
populated a record of a user’s IP address assignments begins to emerge. Using the table below
as a representation of the data fed into the IPAR, law enforcement and other IPAR users will
have an accurate record of the historical IP addresses assigned to customers and for what
period each user had the IP address for their use.

43

Timeanddate.com. “GMT – Greenwich Mean Time.”
http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/eu/gmt.html (accessed November 3, 2010).
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ISPID
1895577
7775633
7632478
4756352
4722633
4722633
1777755
1895467
1257963
1124590
7983219
1257965
7722651
...
...
...

Format Field
6
4
4
6
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
...
...
...

IP Address
fe80:0:0:0:0:0:a59:4202
87.63.89.111
128.7.63.9
fe80:0:0:0:0:0:ac6:4d59
fe80:0:0:0:0:0:c0a8:20a
fe80:0:0:0:0:0:c0a8:216
198.225.112.87
30.250.17.95
21.225.78.53
45.6.211.9
10.198.22.56
172.22.96.89
192.168.2.10
...
...
...

Last Name
Oneida
Haviezeh
Pike
Kincade
Brown
Brown
Lambert
Oda
Sanchez
Neal
Slate
Gordone
Ouellette
...
...
...

First Name
Uda
Rameira
Trenton
Rosaire
Mary
Mary
Ralph
Kathy
Have
Beverly
Philip
Helen
Rita
...
...
...

Zip
13042
90210
37201
30301
11040
11040
83728
60601
27609
99501
06155
28202
04101
...
...
...

Date
20100531
20100720
20100819
20101001
20101107
20101130
20101113
20101118
20101125
20101201
20101218
20101219
20101225
...
...
...

Time
23:58:02
10:28:11
17:33:59
11:31:45
22:01:11
18:15:07
13:45:19
12:02:02
19:05:05
6:12:54
1:17:45
2:02:09
9:47:03
...
...
...

Figure 3: IPAR Data

Query and Selection Application

In order for the IPAR tool to be truly usable in its intended manner, sorting and selection
criteria will have to be developed into an easy-to-use query application. The IPAR application,
or IPAP, will offer the following usability features:

•

Three-factor authentication login window ensuring secure access to IPAR data.

•

Data look-up functionality allowing for selection by Name (Last Name, then First), and IP
Address

•

Printing and saving functionality.
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Two-factor authentication is the most common industry standard for authenticating users as
they attempt to access secure data.44 Any method that requires dual entry to obtain access can
be deemed two-factor authentication; however, the truest forms incorporate the use of tokens
or fobs for the most secure levels of access. For the IPAR Application (IPAP), three-factor
authentication is defined and represented in the following login screen:

Figure 4: IPAR Login Screen

Remember that law enforcement must register with the IPAR in order to obtain access to the
data. Only validated law enforcement and governmental agencies will be granted access to use
the system. Upon successful registration, users are provided with a Login ID and a system
generated, sequentially-assigned numeric Registration Number. Once prompted to create the
initial password for the account, these three pieces of information must be entered in order to
gain access to the IPAR.

Bradley, Tony. About.com. “What is Two-Factor Authentication?” Understanding what two-factor
authentication is and how it works. http://netsecurity.about.com/od/quicktips/qt/twofactor.htm (accessed
November 14, 2010).
44
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Data lookup functionality is then presented to the user. Users are offered the ability to sort by
both Name and IP Address. The following image provides an example of the Name Query
screen and the data presented:

Figure 5: IPAR Name Query Screen

Queried data is sorted by the name queried, in alphabetical order by Last Name then First
Name. Names that are an exact match to the selection criteria are highlighted for easy
recognition, with the remaining fields presented for further ability to narrow the selection to an
individual record. Additional sorting presents each record in order by Zip Code, Date and Time.
In this example, the first six records provide an outline of one customer and their IP Address
assignments over a period of 55 days.
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Similar processes are in use in selections by IP Address. The IP Address Query screen is shown
below:

Figure 6: IPAR Address Query Screen

Selected data is presented in order by IP Address. Records matching the queried IP are
highlighted for quick recognition. Data is then further sorted by the Date and Time of the
assignment of the IP Address, providing a historical record of the assignment of this specific
address. ISPID values remain the same on each record as this IP address block belongs to a
specific service provider.

Within each query screen are the options to Print or Save the data results. This ability to make
a permanent record of the queried data is critical in criminal investigations. Evidence must be
available in a format that is admissible as evidence. Without proper accompanying data,

62
‘screen shots’ of data from a terminal are not viewed with the same quality rating as report
data that has date and timestamp values within the report structure. Providing proper header
information containing the IPAR designation along with the data and time of the report and
subsequent data provides a highly credible record of the IP Address data for submission in legal
proceedings.
Sample report data is shown here:

Figure 7: IPAR Address Report

From the outline of the data represented here, it is critical that the data be sent from the ISP in
the correct format and order. For the larger ISPs, this extract can be programmed as an
automated forwarding of data from the same systems that provide the IP address to the
subscriber or from the tools that house this information for customer support troubleshooting.
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For the smaller ISPs however, with less sophisticated systems, automation of this data
submission may not be possible. As such, there must be a manual submission process available
for providers to manually enter data into the IPAR. This manual entry would have to contain
the same information and follow the same data string as shown above. Here is how the manual
entry process would work.

Regardless of the size of the provider each registrant is presented with an IPAR login screen as
shown here. This is the same login entry point that was shown previously, as the same portal is
used whether retrieving or submitting data.

Figure 8: IPAR Registrant Login Screen

Based upon the registration number entered in the login screen, the user is either presented
with tools to query data or the forms necessary to enter data. For the service provider who is
entering data, the following screen is displayed after a successful login:
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Figure 9: IPAR Manual Data Entry Screen

Here the provider is presented with all the necessary input fields to complete a manual IPAR
record. Each field is formatted to ensure data is entered in the proper format for the database
structure. Selecting either IP version 4 or 6 enables not only population of the single digit value
within the Format Field; it also enables formatting within the corresponding IP Address input
field. Formatting within the Date Input Field ensures data follows the YYYY / MM / DD format
and Time can be entered directly in GMT format or converted using the GMT conversion
button. Once the input record is completed, pressing the Submit button enters the data into to
the IPAR database.
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Figure 10: IPAR Error Messaging Example

Error messaging within the form structure ensures all data is entered and messages displayed
when there are errors or omissions.

While enabling manual entry into the IPAR ensures even the smallest of providers can comply
with reporting requirements, it is not a feasible or reasonable method for data entry for midsize or large providers whose IP data is changing constantly. The ideal solution for accurate
IPAR data is automation of the transmission process.

Requestor Accounts

Having defined the application, it is important to next define the agencies that will be allowed
access to the IPAR. Privacy and security are of primary importance so a definition of who will
be allowed access to retrieve information from the IPAR is critical to ensuring its acceptance as
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a legitimate tool. Similar to the Department of Motor Vehicle, the IPAR is intended for use by
law enforcement and government agencies. Governmental agencies that have access to
interception and wiretap data include45:
•

US Government Agencies, such as the United States Government itself, or any court,
department or subdivision of the United States Government. The US Department of
Homeland Security is also included here.

•

State Agencies. These include any state government itself, such as the State of New
York, and any court, department, or subdivision of that state. Many states also define
School Districts and School Administrative Units as state agencies.46

•

Public law enforcement agencies. This group includes:
o State and Federal Attorneys General
o State and Federal Bureaus of Investigation
o State Troopers and Highway Patrol agencies
o State and Federal Departments of Public Safety
o State and Federal Bureau of Securities and Investigative Services
o State local and municipal law enforcement departments

•

Special districts. These can sometimes includes county service areas, such as taxing or
zoning agencies, but only ones that qualify by providing proof that they are indeed

California Department of Motor Vehicles. “Government Requester Accounts.”
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/otherser/gra/govreq.htm (accessed December 19, 2010).
45

States and Education – State Administrative Services in Education.
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/2449/States-Education-STATE-ADMINISTRATIVE-SERVICES-INEDUCATION.html (accessed December 28, 2010).
46
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classified as governmental agencies. Special districts are further defined as performing
proprietary functions for the state or federal government within certain limited
boundaries47, such as “New England”.
Each of these agencies, defined as ‘Government Requesters’, would be provided access to the
IPAR. Many of these Federal agencies are already awarded access to surveillance data under
the intercept requirements. All of these entities are granted access to criminal and public data
such as motor vehicle and licensing records. Expanding access to the IPAR for these groups is
well within scope of their responsibilities.

Who would not be granted access to the IPAR? Groups that are currently not defined as
Governmental agencies include:
•

Non-Profits Agencies regardless of whether they are fully or partially funded by another
governmental agency.

•

Private Police Departments. This includes any fire or police department that is fully
owned and operated by a private company. These are not considered public service
providers and are therefore not granted access to governmental databases.

•

Sovereign or foreign nations. This includes tribal nations within the United States or
foreign nations outside the United States such as Canada and Mexico. While it is
common for Federal Agencies to share information with Canadian and Mexican
authorities, in particular in criminal investigations that cross national borders, these

University of Kansas. Center for Teaching Excellence. “Special Districts.”
www.cte.ku.edu/.../Presentation%20Example%204%20Special%20Districts.ppt (accessed December 28, 2010).
47
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foreign authorities are not awarded direct access to information on American citizens.
As such, these entities would also not be granted access to the IPAR.
Requesting access to the IPAR requires a registration process for access. While online
applications are commonplace, most state agencies require completion of written forms in
order to obtain access to databases such as motor vehicle registrations. One example from the
State of California requires the completion of a four-page application in addition to signed
agreement to a two-page Information Security Statement.48 Other states define requirements
for annual renewal and annual recertification. Areas that remain consistent in the application
process include:
•

Definition of the agency requesting access

•

Classification of the application as New, Change, or Renewal of access

•

Jurisdiction of the agency as State, Federal, or Other forms of agency

•

Format of data access such as online, paper/hardcopy, tape, or secure transfer such as
FTP

•

Security guidelines outlining definitions of appropriate of use, security provisions, and
processes for security or data breach.

These guidelines provide a sufficiently secure method of providing law enforcement and
governmental agencies access to the IPAR. The data contained within the IPAR and the security
considerations relative to that data fall well in line with defined guidelines for other secure

State of California Department of Motor Vehicle. “Information Security Statement.”
ttp://www.dmv.ca.gov/forms/inf/inf1128.pdf (accessed December 28, 2010).
48
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state and federal databases as defined above. As such, the registration process for the IPAR
would follow suit. An example Requester Account Application is shown here:

Figure 11: IPAR Requester Account Application
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In the format displayed above, this application contains the same sections as are defined in
accessing secure data from the motor vehicle database, including specifics for maintaining
proper safety once access is granted. When the application process is completed and access is
approved, the requester is returned an approval authorization along with their registration
number and temporary credentials to use. An example authorization form is displayed here:

Figure 12: IPAR Authorization Form

The descriptions above outline the process for gaining inquiry access to the IPAR database.
Service providers must also complete an authorization process in order to submit data to the
repository. The application and authorizations for submitters vary from those requesting
inquiry. An example is shown on the following pages and includes fields for serving area, IP
address assignment ranges, and types of service provided.
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Figure 13: IPAR Provider Submission Account Registration Application Page 1
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Figure 14: IPAR Provider Submission Account Registration Application Page 2
Once the application is received and approved, the service provider is returned an
authorization response very similar to that of a requester. The form below is an example of a
service provider authorization:
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Figure 14: IPAR Service Provider Submission Access Authorization Form

This application and approval process follows similar guidelines and processes in use with the
Department of Motor Vehicles. While much of the process has migrated to online access and
electronic entry, a great deal of the application and authorization processes remain paper
based. In contacting the local state agency to determine why much of the application process is
still document-based, the following reasoning was provided49:

-

Certain systems did not support automation for these processes

-

Age of the system and / or application didn’t support online entry or access (no frontend application entry point exists)

-

State funding at this time did not support the capital needed to fully automate the
application and authorization process

49

Curtis, Kathleen. Phone interview. Kathleen Curtis, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, State of Maine. (Oct. 7, 2010).
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-

Preference within certain legal and state departments were for a handwritten signature
to be present on the application documentation, where automation of access did not
allow for handwritten signatures

-

Belief that the physical copy and written application process provided greater security
control than allowing open online access (no ability to confirm the validity of the user
requesting access)

There is legitimacy to the points referenced above in that many state systems are aged and may
not support many of the upgrades needed for online access. State governments are also short
on funding and would find it financially difficult to retro fit applications to support fully
automated registration and authorization. How, then, do we fund the creation of the IPAR?

Who pays?

Regardless of which entity manages the data, it is ultimately the consumer who has to pay for
it. The growing costs of data archiving and management for an ISP, in the millions of dollars per
year, is eventually transferred on to the subscriber as part of the ISP’s cost of doing business.
The IPAR solution decreases the archiving aspect for an ISP, which reduces both onsite disk and
offsite storage costs, however the systems that regulate usage and allocation of IP addressing
for subscribers would continue to be managed by the provider. This means only a portion of
the costs of IP address management are shifted away from the ISP.
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On the receiving end, State and Federal agencies would now bear the costs of storage and
archiving of the IPAR. While this adds to the initial cost of storage hardware and offsite record
retention, there are several significant cost and operational improvements that offset the
expense.

•

Reimbursement for subpoena processing costs. There can be significant costs involved
in the request, processing, and serving of an official subpoena requesting IP
information. An IPAR solution removes at least one subpoena, in a two-step subpoena
process, the one to the ISP to determine the user of an IP address. ISPs are granted the
ability to charge for their services in response to subpoena requests for information.
An example of cost reimbursement fees for Cox Communication is included in
Addendum A. Fees can include costs for basic information, expedited handling,
additional per-IP fee, copying fees, excessive account lookup fees, data media fees, and
incorrect ISP fees50. Costs charged to the law enforcement agencies ultimately become
a cost of the state or governmental agency they are funded through.

•

Costs for law enforcement. When law enforcement identifies an activity that warrants
investigation, they must first make a request to the District Attorney’s office for a
subpoena to be issued. A typical DA’s office holds a backlog of subpoena requests, so
there is a usual delay in the initial turnaround time for the request to be processed.
Once the subpoena is submitted to the ISP, there is a normal response window of

50

Cox Communication, Inc. “Cox Communication LEA Information Policy”, last modified October 1, 2009. Notice to
parties serving subpoenas on Cox Communication. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/cox-spy.pdf (accessed October 1,
2010).
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anywhere from 10 days to up to 30 days to provide the response. If this is part one of a
two-step subpoena, then the process repeats when the first response is returned. In
these scenarios, it is not unusual for a request by law enforcement for IP information to
take two months and longer. The delays mean increased cost for law enforcement as
investigations take longer and criminal activity continues without impedance. This also
means increased costs for states that fund the expenses of the state’s District
Attorney’s offices. With IP address information stored in an IPAR, there is a direct
reduction in state costs both at the district attorney and law enforcement levels.

•

Witness costs. Depending on the jurisdiction, State and/or Federal governments cover
the cost of ISP witnesses that are subpoenaed to testify in criminal cases. Costs can
include the cost of travel, time, records submission and others. In a criminal case, the
government covers all costs of the prosecution. With direct access to data from the
IPAR, these ISP witness expenses are reduced or removed.

•

Small providers. Certain small ISPs have been unable to comply with current data
retention policies. They have not had either the infrastructure or the financial ability to
record and store subscriber IP assignments. Building such an infrastructure is cost
prohibitive based on their smaller revenue streams, leaving them sandwiched between
the costs to comply and the penalties of noncompliance. An IPAR alternative would
allow these small suppliers to provide subscriber information, whether manually or
automated, to the IPAR and reduce the expense burden of compliance. This would also

77
provide subscriber information for a subset of customers where once this information
was unobtainable.

•

Taxation loses from copyright infringement. In a study conducted by The Institute for
Policy Innovation, titled "The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S.
Economy," the report found that copyright infringement "costs the U.S. economy $58.0
billion in total output, costs American workers 373,375 jobs and $16.3 billion in
earnings, and costs federal, state, and local governments $2.6 billion in tax revenue."51
The key components for reducing piracy comes in improved policing and more rapid
identification of offenders. An IPAR solution allows law enforcement more streamlined
and more real-time access to user identification, greatly improving the chances of
catching perpetrators. At a minimum, a 1% improvement in identification equates to
$2.6 million in increased tax revenues. With accessibility to up-to-date IP address
information, an IPAR solution is likely to provide substantial improvements to tax
revenues far in excess of 1% thus far in excess of $2.6 million.

Considering the costs outlined above, the IPAR is more than a simple transference of process
and fees from one entity to another. There are true costs savings to be realized in a more
streamlined, centralized repository. While these are a few of the cost reductions, there are also
certain fees and taxes that offset the costs of an IPAR. Telecommunications companies are
required to assess State and local taxes for the services they provide to their customers. Those

51

Photo Attorney®. “The Cost of Copyright Infringement.” http://www.photoattorney.com/2007/10/costs-ofcopyright-infringement.html (accessed October 3, 2010).
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taxes would continue to be assessed and paid to the state. Service providers must also assess
and collect Universal Service Fees, as well as FCC fees and 911 fees.52 These fees have been
developed over time to assist with cost allocation for services such as emergency fire and
rescue, as well as costs of delivering services to rural areas. If ISPs were assessed a .5% fee for
each internet subscriber, and an average consumer brings $45/month in revenues per internet
account, the IPAR fee would amount to a 22.5 cent per month cost per subscriber. While this
would help with the reallocation of the data archiving costs for state and federal agencies, the
corresponding reduction in staffing and data management for the ISP would far outweigh the
monthly IPAR fee.

ISPs can also be charged for ISPID registration. As outlined above, the registration process for
the IPAR provides the ISPID tag to be associated with each incoming IP address record. In
addition, the ISP is given a specific and secure IP address to be used as a secure tunnel through
the firewalls to transmit update records to the database. Costs for registration would be
minimized to encourage even the smaller providers to participate, however even the smaller
fee would help offset the costs involved in the creation and securing of the dedicated IP tunnel
per ISP.

As outlined previously, third party providers could also provide a method of offsetting some of
the IPAR costs. Third parties offer a variety of legal and integration services such as completion
of court-ordered records, data communication interception services, and data retention and
archiving services. In addition to providing these critical services to ISPs, these same services
52

Federal Communications Commission. “Understanding your Telephone Bill.” FCC Consumer Facts.
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/understanding.html (accessed October 30, 2010).
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could be used by state and federal agencies as a method to reduce systems development and
corresponding support staff. These are companies that have already met the stringent
guidelines for governmental approval relative to security, privacy, and confidentiality thus many
of the systems could be provided by outsourced entities at less cost.

Finally, referencing back to the Department of Motor Vehicle model, other charges could also
apply for accessing data in the IPAR. One example in use with the DMV is the fee assessed to
obtain a copy of one’s own records.53 It is common for individuals to want to obtain their own
motor vehicle records whether it is for an open legal case or for purposes of verifying the data
contained within the records. This would also be a reasonable request of internet subscribers
or for legal teams representing these subscribers. Where the data applies to the specific
customer, the question of privacy does not factor in and the records can be provided (upon
confirmation of the subscriber’s information) with a small fee assessed to offset the cost of
producing the records. Other fees apply if records are requested via tape, FTP, online or other
electronic methods. While individually each of these fees is small, collectively these revenues
can provide a reasonable offset to some of the systems and storage costs that will come along
with an IPAR deployment.

53

Department of Driver Services. “How do I request a driver history report (MVR)?” December 13, 2010.
http://www.dds.ga.gov/drivers/DLdata.aspx?con=1740840381&ty=dl (accessed December 28, 2010).
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Future Development and Expansion

The future for IPAR lies in the opportunities this type of database would offer in integration
with other databases and other services. While protecting the privacy of IP address information
is key, providing consolidated data to those agencies that already have access to the private
information is an intriguing future for the IPAR. Use of the internet has become the norm.
With more and more applications becoming web-enabled or internet served, the use of IP
addressing will also become the norm across many more devices and services. Is it possible
that vehicles could be assigned IP addresses for their built in navigation and emergency
systems? The answer is yes. That reality is not in the future but one that exists now, in vehicles
like the Chevy Volt. According to GM, “Each Volt also has its own IP address...” based on a
partnership with IBM and GM and integrating 10 million lines of software code into the new
car.54 Could this imply a future where the DMV and the IPAR are integrated into one database
where each vehicle’s registration also includes their IP address?

Other integration options also exist. With a fully functioning IPAR, integrating IP address data
to a criminal background database becomes possible. Marrying these two systems could
provide enormous benefits to law enforcement in tracking criminal behavior beyond physical
activity to combine it with real-time and historical online activity. This becomes more
compelling if the vehicle registration database evolves to include in-car IP addresses as
referenced above, and now all of these separate entities are combined into one consolidated
54

Racoma, J. Angelo. November 3, 2010. “Chevy Volt Electric Cars Each Have Their Own IP Addrss.” IBM & GM Say
Volt’s Electronic Control Unit has 10M Lines of Code & Own IP Address.
http://nexus404.com/Blog/2010/11/03/chevy-volt-electric-cars-each-have-their-own-ip-address-ibm-gm-say-voltselectronic-control-unit-has-10m-lines-of-code-own-ip-address/ (accessed December 27, 2010).
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and complete system. Motor vehicle records and vehicular offenses could be included and
linked by the IP addresses assigned to each new vehicle. Similar to the ability to track
suspended or revoked licenses, could this integrated data be used to track suspended or
revoked user IP addresses?

Some of this integration exists today. A user’s online criminal activity, such as child
pornography, becomes part of their criminal record. Could the reverse be true and a person’s
physical criminal activity be used to identify, and perhaps also prohibit, online activity? This is a
much more compelling and more easily achievable concept if systems such as these are
integrated.

Continuing on with the concept of integration, let’s consider other state and federal systems
that are utilized for employment background checks. This information is important to potential
employers to determine validity of criminal information on an application as well as to confirm
driving eligibility in the event the perspective employee would have access to company
vehicles. Could a system like the IPAR eventually be integrated into a background check report?
If so, then the combined systems could provide information on a user’s IP history and
potentially any suspension or revocation of online access. This could be important information
to a business that needs to ensure information is safeguarded and online behavior is
appropriate with business practices. This also leads to interesting concerns relative to user
confidentiality and privacy, and the separation of personal and workplace internet usage
activity.
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Conclusion

This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and outlines that a
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information without
compromising the security and privacy of internet users. The present process for IP Address
allocation, retention, and protection is no longer sufficient to support retention periods,
archiving costs, and privacy protection. The improvements outlined in the implementation of a
centralized IP address database support recording and archiving of IP Address information, in a
method that is more cost effective, more efficient, and more secure than the current model.
Furthermore, establishing a foundation for this system that is based on existing systems and
existing processes encourages support for this new concept and reduces concerns from the
perspective of user privacy and safety. American citizens think nothing of affixing a license
plate to their vehicles to allow them use of the nation’s highways. This is a simple analogy to
enable a similar treatment for an IP address, in a manner that citizens understand and have an
established confidence that their information is protected for use only by the enforcement
agencies that need it. Thirty years after the true inception of IP version 4, it is no longer
feasible or reasonable to continue following legislative and operational guidelines that were
established long before the Internet was a household or handheld service. The centralized IP
address database provides an improved and secure method to better support the new all-IP
technological environment of the present day and well into the future.
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